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Abstract
This paper documents that the impact of the euro changeover in Jan-
uary 2002 on prices was not uniform across the 12 participating coun-
tries. There are countries where prices increased signiﬁcantly, but there
are also countries where price-setting behaviour during the changeover
does not appear to be very different from other points in time. This pa-
per argues that the above difference can be explained by looking at the
way countries regulated price setting during the changeover, and that
any impact of the changeover could have been avoided with appropri-
ate regulations. The gap between the actual and the perceived impact is
addressed and policy recommendations for future changeovers are pro-
vided.
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The ﬁrst goal of this paper is to document that the impact of the euro
changeover in January 2002 on prices was not uniform across the 12 partici-
pating countries. There some countries in which prices increased signiﬁcantly
but there are also countries in which the changeover does not appear to have
had an effect on prices.
The second goal is normative. There seems to be a relationship between
the impact and the way in which the countries regulated price setting at the
changeover. For example, all countries with a signiﬁcant impact dispensed
with making dual pricing mandatory. The paper argues that any impact on
prices could have been avoided with appropriate price setting regulations. Pol-
icy recommendations for future changeovers are provided.
Given its relevance for economic policy making, the paper also addresses
the perceived impact. People in Europe perceived the changeover to have had
a profound impact on prices. This phenomenon also occurred in countries
where the actual impact on prices was low or even absent. In the literature, the
gap between perceived and actual inﬂation is often considered something pol-
icy makers cannot do much about — an unavoidable side effect of a currency
changeover. This paper argues that instead of an unavoidable side effect, this
was caused by the inexperience of the authorities to cope with such a phenom-
enon. As with the actual impact, the perceived impact can be avoided with
good economic policy.
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31. Introduction
This paper documents that the impact of the euro changeover in January
2002 was not uniform across countries. The impact of the changeover on
the aggregate price level is negligible, but at a lower level of aggregation an
effect on prices is noticeable. Prices in some sectors increased signiﬁcantly in
some countries, but there are also countries where the impact appears absent.
There seems to be a relationship between the impact and the way the countries
regulated price setting during the changeover. I argue that the impact could
have been avoided with appropriate regulations.
Given its relevance for policy making, I also address the perceived impact.
Even in countries where the actual impact was low or absent, people perceived
the changeover to have had a profound impact on prices. This phenomenon
is sometimes considered something policy makers cannot do much about. I
argue that instead of an unavoidable side effect, this is actually caused by the
inexperience of the authorities to cope with such a phenomenon. As with
the actual impact, the perceived impact can be avoided with good economic
policy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview
of related literature and points out how this paper intends to contribute to the
discussion. Then in Section 3, I will discuss the theoretical factors that may
affect price setting during a currency changeover. Section 4 is where I present
the data and the estimation method, and where I discuss the sensitivity of the
ﬁndings. In Section 5, I discuss the ﬁndings and policy implications. The per-
ceived impact is discussed in Section 6 and a summary in Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2. Literature review
Several papers have been written on the impact of the euro changeover on
prices. Most studies are national or euro-area wide and only a few are cross-
country studies. Ercolani and Dutta (2006) and Ehrmann (2006) are two cross-
country studies. The following is a selection of country or euro-area studies.
Gallot (2002) and Banque de France (2002) cover France. For Germany, see
Buchwald et al. (2002b), Chlumsky and Engelhardt (2003) and Bundesbank
(2002a, 2002b, 2004). AverydetailedstudyforFinlandcanbefoundinAalto-
Setälä et al. (2003). Coimbra et al. (2002) document the impact on Portuguese
prices and for the Netherlands, Folkertsma et al. (2002) is a good source. The
European national central banks discuss the impact in their monthly bulletins
in 2002. For euro-area studies see Eurostat (2003) and the monthly bulletins
4of the European Central Bank.
The impact of the changeover on prices was rather surprising, especially
for economists, and it is not easy to come up with sound explanations for the
price movements. As the impact was most evident in the restaurant sector,
several papers appeared arguing that menu costs are the driving factor behind
the movements, at least in the restaurant sector. See for example Gaiotti and
Lippi (2005) and Hobijn et al. (2006). An interesting feature of the paper by
Gaiotti and Lippi (2005) is that the authors do not rely on ofﬁcial statistics.
Instead, they use data on prices for restaurant meals from the Michelin Red
Guide. Adriani et al. (2003), relying on data from the Michelin Red Guide as
well, argue that the changeover worked as a coordination device for the restau-
rant sector to shift to a higher price equilibrium. The Bundesbank (2004) ﬁnds
that even two years after the changeover, the price increases in the restaurant
sector are in excess of those predicted by the development of the relevant cost
factors. This might be read as a sign in favour of a multiple equilibria story
because the effect of menu costs is only transitory.
Attractive prices (such as 1.99 or 24.90) received a lot of attention already
before the changeover. When converted into euros these prices often lose their
attractiveness so that ﬁrms are forced to round up or down to the next attrac-
tive price. The question was what would happen if ﬁrms, rather than rounding
both up and down, used the changeover to round prices upwards to the higher
attractive price only. This question was analyzed by Folkertsma (2001) and
Aucremanne and Cornille (2001). See also Fengler and Winter (2001). Folk-
ertsma (2001) estimates for the Netherlands that in the “worst case”, that is, if
prices were only rounded up to the next higher attractive price, the impact on
Dutch CPI inﬂation would be an increase of 0.7 percent. The studies by the
national statistical ofﬁces and the national central banks cited above conﬁrm
the importance of attractive prices in many sectors. It appears however, that
in practice, retailers were very careful when converting prices, which explains
why most studies by the national statistical ofﬁces report no impact on retail
prices.
Two books are worth mentioning — a recent book with several interest-
ing papers on the euro changeover and its effect on inﬂation was edited by
Del Giovane, Lippi and Sabbatini (2005). The second book is about the dec-
imalisation of the British currency in 1971 and was written by Moore (1973).
Moore’s description of people’s perception of the impact of the decimalisation
on prices reveals a surprising similarity to the discussion in Europe after the
changeover in 2002.
Ehrmann (2006) also presents an interesting paper — one of the few cross-
country studies — that tries to come up with an explanation for the impact that
5is not restricted to speciﬁc sub-sectors (like restaurants). Ehrmann argues that
given that converting prices is costly, consumers will rely on rules of thumb
and ignore small price changes. Retailers might try to take advantage of this
behaviour and increase prices. Ehrmann calls this behaviour “rational inat-
tention” arguing that given that it is costly to convert prices it is rational to
ignore small price changes. This “rational inattention” is related to what I call
“changeover confusion” in the next section. Ehrmann ﬁnds some evidence for
his hypothesis and also reports that the legal requirements to dual price have
helped to control the impact on prices. In an earlier study, Mastrobuoni (2004)
followed an idea similar to Ehrmann’s.
The last set of papers I would like to mention, before showing how this
paper intends to contribute to the literature, is about the perceived impact. The
euro changeover triggered an intense discussion among the European public
about its effect on prices and on inﬂation. Even though we can ﬁnd some
impact on prices in some countries, the perception that the changeover had
a profound impact cannot be supported by the data. An article by the Euro-
pean Central Bank (2005) provides a good overview of people’s perception
of the impact. Several explanations have been brought up for this phenom-
enon. Fluch and Stix (2005) is a good source. More literature on this issue is
presented in Section 6 below.
With this paper I would like to contribute to the literature above in several
ways. First, I will describe in detail the forces that affect price setting behav-
iour during a currency changeover. Second, I will show that the impact of the
euro changeover was not uniform across countries. There are countries where
prices increased signiﬁcantly, but there are also countries where price-setting
behaviour at the changeover does not appear to be very different from other
points in time. Third, based on the theoretical discussion and on the ﬁndings
of a cross-country analysis, I will give speciﬁc policy recommendations for
avoiding the impact in future changeovers. The main emphasis of the paper
will be on normative aspects.
Given the relevance for economic policy-making I will also address the
perceived impact. In the literature, this phenomenon is often viewed as some-
thing policy makers cannot do much about — an unavoidable side effect of a
changeover. I argue that, as with the actual impact, the perceived impact can
be avoided with good economic policy.
3. Factors affecting prices during a changeover
A currency changeover is not necessarily a “neutral” event that keeps rel-
ative prices unchanged. There are several factors or forces that may have an
6effect on prices1. In this section I will identify these factors and show that any
impact is not likely to be uniform across sectors. There are sectors where an
impact is more likely.
Two forces are central to understanding the price movements we will see
in the next section. The ﬁrst one may be called “changeover confusion” and
the second “changeover awareness”. Besides these two forces, there are other
factors that may affect prices. These are competition or ﬁrms’ market power,
“attractive” prices, and menu costs. The reason why I do not consider them
central is explained below.
3.1. Two central forces
The introduction of unfamiliar coins and banknotes and the changing of all
nominal prices lead to some confusion among consumers, and ﬁrms might try
to take advantage of this. This is the same kind of confusion tourists experi-
ence when travelling to countries with a different currency. I will refer to this
phenomenon as “changeover confusion”.
In the next section we will see that prices in many sectors increased with
the introduction of euro coins and banknotes. The standard explanation for
this is that ﬁrms tried to take advantage of the changeover. This explanation
seems reasonable. Note that this explanation does not require households to
actually be confused. All that is needed for prices to increase is that ﬁrms
believe that households are confused.
It is common in the literature to talk about “confusion” though different
names for this phenomenon can be found as well. Ehrmann (2006) calls it “ra-
tional inattention”, arguing that given the costs of calculating the exact con-
version it is rational for consumers to ignore small price changes.
The changeover confusion exerts an upward pressure on prices. There is
however, asecondforcethatexertsadownwardpressureonprices—“change-
over awareness”. At the time of the euro changeover, the public was quite
concerned about increasing prices and the media showed many reports about
how ﬁrms converted prices. This increased awareness made it difﬁcult for
ﬁrms to take advantage of the changeover and in some cases it appears to have
induced ﬁrms to lower prices.
It is important to understand that this second factor affects small and larger
ﬁrms differently. If, for example, a small, independent shoe repair shop in-
creases prices at the changeover by a few percent it is not likely that a newspa-
per would write about this. If, however, a large company like McDonalds or a
1This discussion is based on Eife (2006).
7large retail chain increases prices at the changeover, it would not be surprising
to ﬁnd the media reporting on this. The risk of damaging their reputation is
higher for larger ﬁrms. Larger ﬁrms, however, can use this increased coverage
in the media to their advantage and make good publicity by lowering prices if
margins permit2.
From a policy maker’s perspective the changeover awareness is interesting.
It is this awareness of both consumers and the media that can be used to as-
sure that the changeover remains a “neutral” event without affecting relative
prices. The regulations available to policy makers make use of the increased
awareness during the changeover.
3.2. Predicting the impact on prices
With the two central factors in mind, we can now try to predict in which
markets or sectors we might see some effect on prices. Following the line of
argument above, we are likely to ﬁnd an increase in sectors that are dominated
by smaller ﬁrms such as the restaurant sector, or the services sector in general.
Unlike the services sector, retailing is generally dominated by larger chains so
thatwewillprobablynotobservepriceincreasesinthissector. Thereare, how-
ever, items where even larger retailers can take advantage of the changeover
without risking damaging their reputation. When prices are very volatile, be-
cause of seasonality for example, consumers lack a reference price. Increases
in fruit and vegetable prices will be observed by consumers and the media, but
lacking a reference price they will have difﬁculties understanding whether the
increase was due to the changeover or because of, say, bad weather.
Prices of fruit and vegetables increased sharply at the changeover. This
increase is usually explained by bad weather conditions (European Central
Bank, 2002b). This is a possible explanation. When we look at the data in the
next section we should, however, keep in mind that seasonal products belong
to the kind of items where a price increase caused by the changeover is more
likely than for other items.
One more comment about prices of fruit and vegetables is necessary. In
January 2002, non-euro countries like Sweden or the United Kingdom ob-
served an increase in fruit and vegetable prices as well and this is sometimes
used as an argument in favour of the “weather-story”. This argument is not
stringent. Suppose vegetable sellers view the changeover as an opportunity
to make extra proﬁts. Assume further that the supply of vegetables is price
inelastic in the short run because of ﬁxed production capacities or because the
good cannot easily be stored. Then, the transitory proﬁt opportunities created
2Price reductions in the fast food sector are reported by Setälä (2003) and Eife (2006).
8by the changeover (even if only presumed) may negatively affect supply in
neighbouring countries leading to higher prices there. Stated differently, from
a theoretical point of view it is possible that the euro changeover in Germany
raised vegetable prices in Denmark.
I would like to emphasize that the impact of the changeover on prices is not
necessary. Wewillseeinthenextsectionthattherearecountriesthatwereable
to avoid the impact. My point here in predicting the impact is only to show
that if an impact does occur, it is likely to follow the pattern just described.
3.3. Other factors affecting prices
When trying to ﬁnd an explanation of why a ﬁrm increases its prices at the
changeover, it is tempting to argue with competition or market power in gen-
eral. It is correct that a ﬁrm is only able to take advantage of the changeover,
if it has some degree of market power. It is, however, not correct to reverse
the argument. Observing that only small restaurants increase prices does not
imply that small restaurants have more market power than larger restaurant
chains in general. It is only because of the particular way the changeover
awareness (temporarily) affects price setters that small and large ﬁrms display
different price setting behaviour.
One reason why a currency changeover may affect real prices is pricing
points, also called “attractive prices”. Two types of attractive prices are distin-
guished, psychological and round prices. Psychological prices typically have
a 9-ending such as 1.99 or 24.90. This type of price is often found in the retail
sector. In the services sector round prices, such as 1.60 for a cup of coffee,
are more common (Bundesbank, 2004; Aalto-Setälä, 2003). Converting these
prices at the ofﬁcial exchange rate often makes them less attractive so that sell-
ers will round prices up or down to the next pricing point. This rounding leads
to intense adjustments during the changeover, but given the large number of
prices that enter an index, movements of price indices cannot be attributed to
rounding alone.
An interesting factor that may affect pricing behaviour during a change-
over is menu costs, that is, the costs of printing new price tags or menus in the
case of restaurants (Gaiotti and Lippi, 2005; Hobijn et al., 2006). The reason
why menu costs have received so much attention in the literature is probably
because the impact of the changeover was especially evident in the restau-
rant sector. Menu costs may induce ﬁrms to either postpone price adjustment
that they would otherwise have made prior to the changeover or bring for-
ward some anticipated price rises so that the price changes coincided with the
changeover. This postponing and anticipating will cause an upward trending
9index to jump up at the point of the changeover.
The particular step-like pattern implied by menu costs is rarely found in
the data. Only in the case of services such as restaurants does the actual shape
bear some similarity with the shape implied by menu costs (see Figure 1 in the
next section). There are, however, several reasons why I do not ﬁnd the menu
cost argument very convincing — not even for the restaurant sector. First, if
menu costs were the driving force behind the increases in restaurant prices
we should observe an upward jump in all twelve euro countries. There are,
however, countries like Austria where the restaurant sector was not affected
by the changeover. Second, the effect of menu costs on an index is only tem-
porary, but in the data the impact appears to be lasting (Bundesbank, 2004).
A third difﬁculty in the menu cost story is that prices of smaller restaurants
increased while prices of larger chains remained constant or decreased. This
is also difﬁcult to reconcile with menu costs.
4. Estimating the impact of the changeover
In this section I will ﬁrst present the data. In Subsection 4.1 the impact
of the changeover is estimated. Subsection 4.2 presents the estimation results,
and 4.3 discusses in detail my measure of the impact and provides a sensitivity
analysis.
The data I am using are the individual series of the HICP basket (Har-
monised Index of Consumer Prices). This data are published by Eurostat,
the statistical ofﬁce of the European Union. For each country a separate bas-
ket is available and the sample ranges from January 1996 to December 2005
(monthly data). Sixteen countries are included in the study, all twelve euro
countries plus the three European Union members Denmark, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, and the non-member Norway. These four non-euro coun-
tries serve as a reference. Each basket contains 94 items ranging from bread
and cereals to various services.
There are some items in the basket where prices reﬂect administrative acts
rather than decisions by the ﬁrms. Examples are medical services, public
transport, sewage and refuse collection, and education. The indices for these
“regulated items” will be dropped from the analysis. The European Central
Bank (2004) identiﬁes nine “regulated items”. I have also dropped the index
for “tobacco”, so that each of the 16 baskets contains 84 items3. Examples of
two price indices are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
3Germany, Spain and the Netherlands increased taxes on tobacco at the time of the
changeover (January 2002) leading to a pointed increase of the index.
10Figure 1: Restaurant Prices in Germany and Austria
Figure 1 shows the index of restaurant prices in Germany and Austria from
January 1996 to December 2005. In Germany the impact of the changeover is
noticeable. In Austria, restaurant prices appear unaffected by the changeover.
Figure 2 shows how the index of vegetable prices in the twelve euro coun-
tries developed over the sample period. The upper panel shows the index,
the lower panel the inﬂation rate. A seasonal pattern is clearly visible. Note
that both the highest level and the highest inﬂation rate coincide with the
changeover.
4.1. Measuring the impact
I estimate whether the changeover had a signiﬁcant impact on one of the
84 indices in a country’s basket with the following model.
πi,t = bi,0 + bi,1deuro + bi,2πi,t−1 +
X11
m=1 δi,mMm, (1)
where πi,t is inﬂation of item i, deuro is a changeover dummy that equals 1
in January 2002 and zero otherwise. Seasonality is captured by using eleven
monthly dummies Mm. Equations are estimated separately using OLS. I call
theimpactofthechangeoveronagivenseriessigniﬁcantiftheestimateforbi,1
11Figure 2: Vegetable Prices in EU12
ispositiveandsigniﬁcantat5percent. Somepricesdecreaseatthechangeover,
but only a few and no pattern emerges.
In order to make the impact comparable across countries, I count the num-
ber of indices for which I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive bi,1 for each country.
My measure of the impact is then the percentage of the series in the HICP
basket with a signiﬁcant in crease at the changeover. Table 1 below displays
the measure for all 16 countries.
4.2. Estimation results
Table 1 shows that the impact measure ranges from 3.8 in Norway to 28.9
in Germany. The non-euro countries are denoted by an asterisk. Note that
by construction, the measure is bounded between 0 and 100 and if the data
were normally distributed, an estimate of around 5 percent should be expected
for purely statistical reasons. The mean impact of 6.2 percent in the non-euro
countries should not be understood as a “euro-effect”, but simply reﬂects the
volatility of the data.
The table shows that there is a considerable difference between the coun-
tries. The impact in the four non-euro countries is smaller than in most euro
countries. There are some euro countries like Greece, Luxembourg or Ireland
12Table 1: The Impact of the Euro Changeover on the HICP Basket
where — by confronting the impact with the non-euro countries — it is prob-
ably safe to claim that the changeover had no effect on prices. The impact
measure for the Netherlands and Germany is considerable. I will try to show
how we can explain these differences in the next section.
The restaurant sector is the most heavily affected one. Only three of the
twelve euro countries were able to avoid a signiﬁcant increase in this sector
(Austria, Greece, and Ireland). The items where I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase
in at least three euro countries can be classiﬁed into two groups. The ﬁrst
group contains services such as restaurants, repair of household appliances,
repair of transport equipment, cinema tickets or hair dressing. The second
group contains seasonal items such as fruit, vegetables and garden plants and
ﬂowers. Only three series cannot be assigned to the two groups above. These
are insurance connected with dwelling, insurance connected with transport,
and recording media. In the case of the two insurance series, I doubt that
the increase is related to the euro changeover. In many countries insurance
series exhibit a step-like pattern with increases at the beginning of the year
and insurance policies do not have to be rewritten at a changeover. In the case
of recording media, the increase appears to be related to the changeover.
The prices of these items increased by around 10 percent in the case of
seasonal products and by around 3 percent in the case of services. The total
weight of the items in the overall basket is relatively small at around 5 percent,
which explains why the impact is barely noticeable on the overall price level
and on HICP inﬂation.
134.3. Discussion of the impact measure and sensitivity analy-
sis
At this point it is useful to discuss the impact measure and report on the
sensitivity of the estimates above. The estimation results and explanations of
the pattern are discussed in Section 5.
The goal of this estimation exercise is to reveal how the impact of the
changeover differs across countries. Using the same model for all countries
is necessary to make sure that the differences between countries are not gen-
erated by different model speciﬁcations. The only exception to this rule is that
for the Netherlands I include an additional dummy that captures the VAT in-
crease in January 2001. For all other 15 countries the model is that shown in
Equation 1.
Here I am not interested in the absolute size of the price increases. I am
interested more in whether or not an increase occurred. My measure of the
impact should, therefore, be understood as a qualitative measure, not a quan-
titative measure. Also, the measure is an unweighted measure and does not
take into account that the different series enter the overall basket with differ-
ent weights. This point should be remembered when comparing the measure
shown in Table 1 with estimates of the impact on the overall basket and or on
inﬂation.
A nice feature of the measure is that it reveals differences between coun-
tries. There are some countries where the changeover had a signiﬁcant im-
pact, but there are also countries where the impact appears absent. Comparing
weighted measures, such as the impact on the overall inﬂation rate, does not
expose these country differences.
The statistics in Table 1 are robust to different model speciﬁcations. Not
including lagged inﬂation or adding up to 12 lags of inﬂation barely affects
the estimates and in particular does not affect the ranking. The ﬁrst lag of
inﬂation is signiﬁcant in many series, and adding lagged inﬂation improves
residual behaviour. Adding higher order lags of inﬂation does not appear to
improve the estimations.
In Equation 1, I implicitly assumed that any impact of the changeover
would occur right when the euro coins and banknotes were introduced (Jan-
uary 2002). It is, however, possible that in some countries the impact spread
over several months. The important question that arises here is whether the
differences between countries highlighted in Table 1 can be explained by the
fact that in some countries (e.g. Netherlands and Germany) the impact was
more concentrated and that in other countries the impact spread over several
months. This hypothesis can be tested by widening the impact “window” from
14one month (as in Equation 1) to several months around the changeover. Tech-
nically, in the case of a ﬁve-month window, the euro-dummy (deuro) takes the
value 1 in the 5 month period from October 2001 until February 2002 and zero
otherwise. If the impact in, say, Greece or Luxembourg is spread over several
months then by widening the window the measure should rise signiﬁcantly
above the measure for the non-euro countries and converge to the estimates of
Netherlands and Germany. This is, however, not the case. By widening the
window from one up to seven months I do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences be-
tween the four non-euro countries and the countries for which Table 1 reports
a low or absent impact.
5. Discussion and policy implications
InthissectionIwilldiscusshowwecanexplaintheﬁndingsoftheprevious
section and give speciﬁc policy advice. The impact estimates in Table 1 show
that the impact of the changeover was not uniform across countries. There are
countries where the impact seems to be quite signiﬁcant and other countries
where the impact appears to be absent. I will argue (1) that this difference can
be explained by the way in which the countries regulated price setting, and (2)
that any impact on prices can be avoided with appropriate regulations.
The predictions we made in Section 3 are nicely conﬁrmed. We predicted
that the impact would be most visible in the case of seasonal items and in
sectors dominated by smaller ﬁrms, such as the restaurant sector. Only in
the case of recording media do I not have an explanation. My impression is
that the increase in this series was caused by the changeover. In the case of
vegetables and other seasonal products it might be that bad weather had played
a role. Considering, however, the sizeable impact shown in Figure 2, I tend to
view the increase as related to the changeover.
5.1. Making dual pricing mandatory
The interesting question raised by the previous section is how we can ex-
plain the numbers in Table 1. Why are there countries where the changeover
had a signiﬁcant impact on prices and why are there countries where the
changeover appears not to have had any effect? As mentioned above, I argue
that this difference can be explained by the way in which countries regulated
price setting. There are several instruments a country can use to regulate prices
during a changeover. One of the more effective instruments is dual pricing.
Figure 3 shows how an obligation to dual price affects price setting behav-
iour. To construct this ﬁgure, I split the 16 countries into three groups. The
15ﬁrst group (left column) dispensed with making dual pricing mandatory. In
the second group (centre) dual display of prices was mandatory and the third
group are non-euro countries. The vertical axis of Figure 3 shows the impact
measure from Table 1. The non-euro countries in the right hand column have
a mean “impact” of slightly more than 6 percent. Again, the impact in the
non-euro countries should not be understood as a “euro-effect”, but simply as
a reﬂection of the volatility of the data. The horizontal line is the upper bound
of the 95 percent conﬁdence interval around the four non-euro countries. One
way to interpret this line is that countries below it were able to avoid an impact
and countries above the line experienced an impact.
Figure 3: Dual Display of Prices
The interesting pattern that emerges is that all countries with a signiﬁcant
impact dispensed with making dual pricing mandatory and countries with a
dual pricing obligation experienced either no (Austria and Greece) or only a
moderate impact (Finland and Portugal). The ﬁgure also shows that making
dual pricing mandatory is not necessary to avoid an impact. Countries like
Belgium, Ireland, and Luxembourg experienced no impact without having a
dual pricing obligation.
Austria and Portugal required dual pricing for ﬁve months starting in Oc-
tober 2001. Greece obliged ﬁrms to dual price for eleven months starting
already in March 2001. In Finland, the dual pricing obligation started right
with the changeover in January 2002 and ended two months later. In the eight
countries where dual pricing was not mandatory, covenants or “best practice”
16agreements recommended that retailers dual price. The pressure on retailers
to do so differed, however. Belgium provides a nice example of how pressure
to dual price can be applied without making it mandatory. Belgian regulations
provided that dual pricing would become mandatory if dual pricing practices
were not taken up on a widespread basis by ﬁrms. Belgium ﬁrms met the pre-
speciﬁed benchmarks so that dual pricing remained “voluntary”. Belgium did
not experience a signiﬁcant impact.
In order to further test the effectiveness of dual pricing it would be nice to
have data showing the extent to which dual pricing was practiced. For many
countries, survey data on dual pricing are available but there are two problems.
The ﬁrst is that the surveys are country speciﬁc and often do not look at the
same sectors. Especially for the services sector data are often not available.
The second problem is that the survey results “always tend to be overstated”
(European Commission, 2000). In many countries, ﬁrms were interested in
making dual pricing appear widely practised so that the survey data is not
reliable.
An important question raised by Figure 3 is why Germany experienced
such a large impact. Like most countries in the left hand column, German
regulations did not foresee any implicit threat of regulatory actions if retail-
ers did not meet minimum benchmarks concerning dual pricing. Reading the
German regulations, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd great differences between them and
the regulations of the other countries in the left hand column. There is, how-
ever, one important detail that makes the German regulations different from
that of any of the other eleven countries. While in all other countries (volun-
tary) dual pricing was possible for many months and sometimes years after
the changeover, the German regulations barred dual pricing two months after
the changeover. From 1 March 2002 onwards, retailers had to denote prices
only in euro. Having such a regulation means that in Germany within the two
months following the changeover all price tags had to be replaced. I felt it
important to note this here, but I have to admit that I am not sure how we can
theoretically explain that this collective changing of price tags affects ﬁrms’
price setting behaviour.
In the literature on this subject, there seems to be general agreement that
dual pricing should only be considered a temporary measure to encourage con-
sumers to adopt the new scale of values (Burgoyne et al., 1999). The German
authorities were right in restricting the period in which dual pricing was possi-
ble, but probably should have allowed some more time to avoid this collective
changing of price tags within such a short time span. In France, the regulations
originally prohibited dual pricing from July 2002, but this directive was later
amended so that in the French retail sector dual pricing was not uncommon
even three years after the changeover. In most euro countries dual price tags
17could be found two or three years after the changeover. In the section on the
perceived impact I will come back to the question whether dual pricing should
be restricted at some point.
5.2. Policy implications
Beforediscussingthepolicyimplicationsitisusefultorecalltheforcesthat
affect price setting during a currency changeover. The forces relevant for this
discussion are the two central forces of Section 3.1, the changeover confusion
that exerts an upward pressure on prices, and the changeover awareness that
exerts a downward pressure on prices. Also, remember that small and large
ﬁrms are affected differently by the changeover awareness. Larger supermar-
ket chains, department stores orrestaurant chains willbe particularly carefulin
convertingpricesaccuratelyormayroundpricesofftoaloweramount. Taking
advantage of the increased media coverage, larger ﬁrms have an opportunity
to obtain good publicity by rounding prices down.
When I started studying the regulations of the different countries, I ﬁrst
thought that countries that did not experience any impact used regulatory in-
struments that the other countries did not have. It should, however, be clear
from the discussion so far, that the absence of one instrument can easily be
compensated by other instruments. Belgium that dispensed with mandatory
dual pricing, provides a nice example. Another aspect emphasized by Deloitte
and Touche (1999) is that in some countries the tendency to comply with the
rules might be stronger than in others. These points explain why it is not easy
to ﬁnd empirical evidence for or against the effectiveness of speciﬁc policy
instruments and many of the policy implications below will be based on theo-
retical considerations.
From a theoretical point of view, there is no reason why a currency change-
over should affect price indices. If we observe that an index — like vegeta-
bles — increased, it is likely that many ﬁrms in this sector considered the
changeover a proﬁt opportunity. The challenge for policy makers is to create
an environment where this “proﬁteering” is costly. Viewed somewhat more
positively, the challenge is to convince (especially the smaller) ﬁrms that it is
to their advantage to keep prices constant or reduce them.
In order to get an idea of the types of instruments available to policy mak-
ers, I will present in some detail the Austrian regulations. Austria was able to
avoid an impact and is one of the few countries where even restaurant prices
appear unaffected. There are some shortcomings that I will point out, but in
general the Austrian regulations can serve as a model for future changeovers.
In what follows, I will only document the most relevant parts of the regula-
18tions. More information can be found in BMWA (2001).
Austria was the ﬁrst country in Europe to introduce a generalized dual pric-
ing obligation. The law required dual pricing in principle for all goods and ser-
vices. This not only covered goods displayed in shop windows, showrooms or
vending machines, but also advertising material, cost estimates, tenders, bills
and receipts. Some exemptions were foreseen to lower the burden on smaller
ﬁrms.
The dual pricing obligation started three months before the changeover and
was in force as long as the Austrian Schilling (the legacy currency) was ac-
cepted as legal tender (28 February 2002), but the law foresaw an option
to extend this period until the end of 2002. This option was not exercised.
Technical infringements of the dual pricing obligation carried ﬁnes of around
1400.– euros. Failing to use proper conversion rates and thereby disguising
price increases was considered “excessive pricing” and could be ﬁned with
around 7000.– euros. In cases of repeated infractions, ﬁnes of more than 14
000.– euros could have been imposed.
A nice feature of the Austrian regulation is the clarity about the location
of the Schilling and euro price indications on price labels. Schilling prices
must be at the top or to the left and euro prices below or to the right. This
provision reduces the risk of different retailers adopting different practices,
leaving consumers potentially confused about which price is which.
A problem with dual pricing in general is that people, when faced with
two equivalent prices, one of which is known and the other new, will simply
read the price in the national currency which is more familiar and will not pay
attentiontothenewpriceineuros(Servet, 1998). Theadvantageofarelatively
short period of 5 months, as in Austria, is that it concentrates the attention of
consumers at the critical time around the changeover.
A short comment about the Finnish regulations is necessary. Finland made
dual pricing mandatory, but the impact on prices is higher than the impact
in Austria, for example. In Finland, fruit and vegetable prices and prices for
restaurants and a few other services increased during the changeover. With
only two months, the period of mandatory dual pricing is relatively short, but
the main difference between the Finnish and the Austrian regulations is proba-
bly that in Finland the period of dual pricing started right with the introduction
of the euro coins and banknotes (January 2002). The beginning of such a pe-
riod is often a time of intense replacing of price tags, and combining this with
the changeover might be the reason why the impact in Finland was not as low
as in Austria.
A possible shortcoming of the Austrian regulation is that dual pricing was
not considered an only temporary measure. Even years after the changeover,
19it was not uncommon to ﬁnd dual price tags in retail outlets. This might have
contributed to the fact that Austrians perceived the changeover to have had
a signiﬁcant impact on prices (see Section 6). It might have been better to
restrict voluntary dual pricing after, say, six months in order to “fade out”
the use of dual price tags and encourage consumers to adopt the new scale of
values more rapidly.
Monitoring the dual pricing obligation and adherence to the regulations in
general, was the responsibility of the district authorities. On site checking
and controlling was carried out by existing inspectors. The Federal Ministry
of Economy, who headed the “euro-price commission”, evaluated the inspec-
tors’ reports and organized any necessary amendments. In addition to these
ofﬁcial inspections, several other initiatives were started. Newspapers (even
local) and TV stations monitored price setting independently from the ofﬁcial
monitoring.
Consumer councils lobbied to obtain “fair play guarantees” from retailers.
One retailer (30% market share) pledged to always round down when convert-
ing and another retailer guaranteed not to raise prices of its products during the
ﬁve-month period of compulsory dual pricing (excluding seasonal products).
I doubt, however, that these “fair play guarantees” changed in any way the
price setting behaviour of these large retailers. The increased media coverage
forces large retailers anyway to be careful when converting prices. Nonethe-
less, the lobbying of consumer councils might be helpful because such lobby-
ing increases the pressure on ﬁrms and there is a chance that smaller ﬁrms will
notice this pressure as well.
Several telephone hotlines (“euro hotlines”) were set up where consumers
could ask for information, convey violations of the dual pricing obligation and
report price increases. One consumer council set up a black list on its home-
pagewhereconsumerscouldnameﬁrmsthattookadvantageofthechangeover
and raised prices. This black list, however, was controversial.
An instrument unique to Austria was an explicit ban on proﬁteering from
the changeover. The directive stated that price increases above an “economi-
cally justiﬁed” level at the changeover were not permitted. This ban is some-
times wrongly considered an outright prohibition of any price increase. The
term “economically justiﬁed” was not speciﬁed so that the regulation is fairly
vague on this point. The vagueness is deliberate and made to assure that ﬁrms
could ﬂexibly react to market ﬂuctuations. From a purely legal point of view,
this ban is too weak to be enforceable, but its psychological effect should not
be underestimated. Instruments of this kind help in creating an environment
where ﬁrms are less inclined to view the changeover as a proﬁt opportunity.
206. Digression: the perceived impact
The main subject of this article is the actual impact and how it can be
avoided, but given its relevance for economic policy-making, I would like to
spend some time on the perceived impact.
Figure 4 plots the actual impact against the perceived impact. The numbers
for the actual impact are taken from Table 1. The perceived impact is the
percentage of people that had the impression that prices increased with the
changeover4. This survey was conducted by Gallup (2002) on behalf of the
European Commission four weeks after the changeover.
Figure 4: Perceived versus Actual Impact
People’s perception of the impact is higher, the higher the actual impact
in the country (slope coefﬁcient 0.75 with p-value 0.033). But note the high
y-intercept. Even in countries where prices appear unaffected, people had the
impression that prices had increased.
The positive correlation between actual and perceived impact is not robust
and can only be found in the weeks after the changeover. Whereas in the
survey shown in ﬁgure 4 the average perceived impact is around 63 percent,
this percentage increased to around 90 percent in later surveys (e.g. European
Commission, 2003). A possible explanation for the disappearance of the pos-
itive correlation between actual and perceived impact is that in later surveys
the perceived impact approached its upper bound of 100 percent.
4The question was: “Do you have the feeling that, when converted into euros, prices have
been: more often rounded off to a higher amount.” The other two possible answers were:
“more often rounded off to a lower amount” and “increases and decreases balance”.
216.1. Literature
The perceived impact and the related issue of perceived inﬂation are well
documented, and several explanations have been suggested for this phenom-
enon (e.g. European Commission, 2005; European Central Bank, 2005; Fluch
and Stix, 2005). One explanation is that people continue to use reference
pricesintheoldcurrency. Whencomparingneweuropriceswitholdreference
prices, people tend to hold the changeover responsible for any price increase
they observe and tend to ignore that prices have increased in the years before
the changeover as well. The tendency to use outdated reference prices is the
reason why it is often recommended to restrict the period of dual pricing.
Adifferentexplanationforthisphenomenonstartswiththeobservationthat
most of the items that increased signiﬁcantly are frequently bought items. It
is argued that consumers have a greater perception of price changes for goods
they buy more frequently than for goods they buy less frequently. Also, price
increases are perceived more powerfully than price reductions (Brachinger,
2005). Traut-Mattausch et al. (2004) argue that before the changeover people
held ﬁrm expectations that the euro would bring about price increases and that
these expectations inﬂuenced people’s opinion and judgement of the impact
after the changeover.
Asalientfeatureofthediscussionsabouttheperceivedimpact—andthisis
the reason why I decided to add this section — is that they barely address the
question of how a strong perceived impact can be avoided. The discussions
on this subject give the impression that the perceived impact is something
that policy makers cannot do much about — an unavoidable side effect of a
changeover.
6.2. A communication crisis
Whatever the reason for the strong perceived impact, people are making a
mistake when they perceive the changeover to have had a strong impact and a
good policy should be able to prevent people from getting such false impres-
sions. Rather than an unavoidable side effect, this phenomenon is an example
of a severe communication crisis caused by the inability of the authorities to
properly communicate with the public.
In order to illustrate the point I want to make here, I will describe and com-
ment on the situation in Germany. There are many lessons to be learned and
with respect to the perceived impact, Germany is representative. I will have
to point out where I believe that mistakes have been made, but it is impor-
tant to remember that the perceived impact was unexpected and surprising for
all parties concerned, and that sometimes it is only possible with hindsight to
22understand that a mistake has been made.
WesawintheprevioussectionthattheactualimpactinGermanywaslarger
than in any of the other twelve countries. The impact was, however, restricted
tocertainservicesandpossiblyseasonalproducts. Witharound5percent, their
weight in the HICP basket is quite small and in percentage terms the increases
are not great (around 3 percent in the case of restaurants, for example). Retail
prices in general remained unaffected by the changeover. The data do not
support people’s impression of a strong impact.
In the second half of 2001, a few months before the changeover, there was
an extensive discussion in the German public and the media about how ﬁrms
might take advantage of the changeover and increase prices. Many people
feared that they would be worse off after the changeover. With the introduc-
tion of euro coins and banknotes the discussion resurfaced and within a few
days after the changeover almost everyone had a story about a restaurant or
hairdresser that had doubled its prices when converting into euros. Fuelled
to some extent by media reports, the impression that the changeover led to
considerable price increases became widespread. The increases in prices for
tobacco, insurance, electricity and gasoline — all due to tax increases — and
higher administrative prices (parking fees, public transportation) in many mu-
nicipalities contributed to this impression.
In a joint study, the German statistical ofﬁce and the Bundesbank (Bun-
desbank, 2002a; Buchwald et al., 2002a) already documented the impact in
March 2002. This document is part of a project both institutions started nearly
two years earlier to explore the effects of the euro changeover on price setting
behaviour. Considering that the document was published only a few weeks
after the changeover, it is remarkably detailed.
In May 2002, the German minister of ﬁnance was reported to “admit” that
prices in some sectors have increased (Economist, 2002). In light of the earlier
publication by the German statistical ofﬁce and the Bundesbank, the word “ad-
mit” is surprising but it nicely illustrates people’s sentiment that the authorities
initially tried to cover up the price increases and that it was only after the pub-
lic outcry that they started to admit “failures”. The media heavily criticized the
German statistical ofﬁce for producing insufﬁcient price statistics that down-
played the true cost of living (Focus, 2002). The euro was renamed “teuro”
which is a play on the German word “teuer” meaning dear or expensive and
politicians were quick to join the discussion. The German chancellor openly
supported the protest and the Minister of Consumer Protection invited the me-
dia and representatives from the retailing sector for an “Anti-Teuro-Summit”.
The minister also started a web site where people could ﬁle complaints (En-
gels, 2003).
23In early summer, a chain letter started circulating calling for consumers to
stay home on 1 July 2002 to boycott retailers and service providers. This call
for a strike was also taken up by some parts of the media. The interesting
aspect of this event is that the German Association of Consumer Councils crit-
icized the boycott on the grounds that it is not helpful to discredit entire indus-
tries for the wrongdoings of some of its members (Verbrauchernews, 2002).
In the months following the changeover, domestic demand declined. Rev-
enues in the restaurant sector dropped by around 14 percent (in real terms).
The German Restaurant and Hotel Association called 2002 the “worst year in
decades” (Engels, 2003). It would be interesting to estimate the costs of the
changeover in terms of lost GDP growth.
6.3. Lessons for future changeovers
The situation just described offers several lessons for future changeovers.
Here, I will highlight just three: the lack of “euro observatories”, the com-
munication before and the communication after the changeover. It goes with-
out saying that the actual impact, tax increases and increases in administered
prices such as parking fees or prices for public transport are not helpful and
should be avoided.
6.3.1. Euro observatories
From a public relations viewpoint, the general problem in Germany was
thattherewasnoinstitutionthatassumedtheleadershiproleincommunicating
with the public. A few years before the changeover, Servet (1998) proposed
the creation of “euro-observatories”.
The observatories’ role will be to monitor price conversions;
spot any difﬁculties, collect information, operate as a point of ref-
erence, [and] distribute information [...].
[The observatories] should thus promote transparency of the
changeover by guaranteeing to consumers that the conversion of
national currencies into the euro will not be accompanied by un-
derhand price increases.
[The observatories] must not be regarded as simple “message-
bearers” of governments and administrations, which would totally
undermine their credibility.
24In Germany, no institution was assigned or was able to grow into the role
proposed by Servet (1998), and the institution involved in this part of the
changeover (ministries, central bank(s), statistical ofﬁce, and consumer coun-
cils) barely coordinated their actions. When in May 2002, the Minister of
Finance admitted that some prices had increased with the changeover, he was
apparently unaware that the Bundesbank and the statistical ofﬁce had already
shown this a few months earlier.
A euro-observatory as proposed by Servet cannot work miracles, but hav-
ing an organisation that is able to make credible statements about what hap-
pened and did not happen to prices would have made communication before
and after the changeover easier and many problems could have been avoided.
6.3.2. Pre-changeover communication
Probably the biggest mistake before the changeover was that the authori-
ties did not take people’s fears that the changeover would lead to signiﬁcant
price increases seriously. In such a situation it is helpful to have an organiza-
tion responsible for (and experienced in) communicating with the public. If,
in addition, consumers consider this organization credible, their fears can be
confronted.
When such fears arise, a good way to respond is to assure people that their
fears are taken seriously, that it is possible that some ﬁrms might try to take
advantage of the changeover, that consumers have the right to complain and
that they should do so, and that ﬁrms that increase prices will be contacted and
will have to justify their price setting.
At that point, it is also important (and possible) to remind people that they
should be fair in their criticisms — that when they observe one restaurant
increasing its prices they should not discredit the whole sector, they should
also appreciate if some lower their prices, that not all price increases are
changeover related, that these are the signs of a healthy economy where prices
change over time, that especially in the services sector prices tend to increase
(Do you remember how much you paid for your ﬁrst hair cut?) and that ser-
vices prices will continue to rise after the changeover just as they did before.
These “reminders” should be provided before the changeover. After the
changeover, when people have already formed their opinion, they might sound
didactic and might not serve their purpose.
Besides preparing the public, it is also important to inform retailers and
service providers that there is the danger that price increases of a few ﬁrms
might discredit the whole industry. Firms should also know that if complaints
occur, the ﬁrms concerned will be contacted and asked to justify their price
25setting. Since this policy is for the beneﬁt of the whole sector it should be
possible to win support for it from retail associations.
6.3.3. Post-changeover communication
The joint report by the German statistical ofﬁce and the Bundesbank on the
impact of the changeover was presented to the press on 8 March 2002, and
shortly afterwards several other ofﬁcial reports appeared (e.g. Bundesbank,
2002b; Buchwald et al., 2002b). These reports apparently did not reach a wide
audience and in spring and summer the media were able to provide “new evi-
dence” of the impact even though the reports already documented the impact
comprehensively. It is irrelevant whether journalists were truly unaware of the
reports or whether they deliberately ignored them. Letting the media assume
the role of the institution informing the public of the “truth” about the im-
pact was a serious mistake. First, because media reports are often unbalanced
or even biased, and second, because in the eyes of consumers the authorities
appeared unprepared and confused. If the media do not show any interest in
informing the public about the ofﬁcial reports, communicating directly with
the public via advertisements or infomercials is an option.
The fact that the German statistical ofﬁce and the Bundesbank started their
joint study nearly two years before the changeover shows how serious both
institutions considered this issue. With 18,000 individual price series for 35
separate items, this study is far more detailed than any study presented in the
media. I believe that it would not have been very difﬁcult for these two insti-
tutions to inﬂuence the discussion and assume the leadership role in commu-
nicating with the public on this issue.
Another example of a somewhat unfortunate post-changeover communica-
tion is provided by the European Central Bank (ECB). Commenting on price
developments at the changeover in 2002, the ECB published the following
three statements in its monthly bulletin.
February 2002 (p 20): As regards any pressure on prices stem-
ming from the euro cash changeover, taking the above factors
[weather and taxes] into account, there remains no evidence of
a signiﬁcant upward impact.
March 2002 (p 32): For certain individual components at the
disaggregate level Ç in particular within the services sector —
price increases were observed in January 2002, which could be
associated with the introduction of euro banknotes and coins.
26July 2002 (p 22): Another factor behind the recent rise in the
annual rate of change in services prices appears to be some impact
from the cash changeover. This impact seems to be most evident
in a number of speciﬁc sectors, including restaurants, hairdress-
ing, and dry cleaning.
From the very beginning, the ECB took the rumours that the changeover
might have had an impact on prices seriously and addressed this subject in
almost every issue of its monthly bulletin in 2002. The three statements above
have, however, a serious weakness. In particular for non-specialists (such as
journalists) it appears that the ECB keeps correcting itself. Reading the Feb-
ruary bulletin, a journalist would quote the ECB as saying that there was no
“signiﬁcant upward impact”. In March, the ECB’s position appears to be that
there “could” have been an impact and in July, the ECB’s view about what
caused the impact is clear.
It has to be noted that for the February publication, the January HICP data
werenotavailable, whichisclearlystatedintheBank’sbulletin. Thestatement
that there was no “signiﬁcant upward impact” is based on a rough estimate
(called a ﬂash estimate) of overall HICP inﬂation. No detailed breakdown
into subcomponents is available for the ﬂash estimate. The ECB should be
credited for responding as early as February on the impact of the changeover,
but without available detailed data it might have been better to provide an open
response leaving room to react to later developments.
The March statement that there “could” have been an impact is surpris-
ing. At that time the sizeable increase in restaurant prices shown in Figure 1
was already known. The Bank’s cautious wording can, however, be explained
by its practice of thoroughly investigating price developments before making
statements about causality.
The three statements above, taken individually, are made with the appro-
priate cautiousness and taking into account all the information available at the
time of writing. Looking, however, at the whole sequence they give the im-
pression that previous statements had to be corrected. Even if not intended,
this somewhat unfortunate practice undermines an organization’s credibility
and might have contributed to people’s impression that the authorities initially
tried to cover up the price increases and “admitted” their existence only after
the public outcry.
6.4. Final remarks on the perceived impact
I would like to emphasize again that people’s perception of the impact was
unexpected and surprising for all parties concerned. I had to point out where
27I believe mistakes have been made, but it is clear that it is often only possible
with hindsight to understand that a mistake has been made.
The people are making a mistake if they perceive the euro changeover to
have had a signiﬁcant impact on prices and a good policy should be able to
prevent people from such false impressions. Rather than an unavoidable side
effect of a currency changeover, the perceived impact is caused by the inability
of the authorities to communicate appropriately with the public.
The mistakes made in communicating with consumers and, in general, in
public relations issues are fairly obvious and serious. Letting the media as-
sume the role of the institution informing the public about the “truth” of the
impact and communicating in a way that gives consumers the impression that
the authorities admitted the impact only after the public outcry are just two
examples. However, even being aware of the mistakes made, it will not be
easy to avoid the perceived impact in future changeovers. This is ultimately a
matter of trust. There will always be fears that such an event will bring dis-
advantages, and statements by retailers or politicians are likely to be met with
suspicion. The challenge is to establish an institution with sufﬁcient integrity,
that when reporting on the impact, appears credible.
7. Summary
The main proposition of this paper is that the impact of the euro changeover
in January 2002 could have been avoided with appropriate price setting reg-
ulations. In order to support this hypothesis I show that the impact was not
uniform across euro-countries. There are countries with a signiﬁcant impact,
but there are also countries where the impact appears to be absent. This differ-
ence can be explained by the way the countries regulated price setting during
the changeover. For example, all countries with obligatory dual pricing expe-
rienced either no or only a moderate impact and all countries with a sizeable
impact dispensed with making dual pricing mandatory.
Support for this hypothesis also comes from theoretical considerations.
There are two factors or forces that affect price setting during a currency
changeover — changeover confusion and changeover awareness. The intro-
duction of unfamiliar coins and banknotes and the changing of all nominal
prices lead to some confusion among consumers and ﬁrms might try to take
advantage of this to increase prices. This confusion exerts an upward pressure
on prices. There is, however, a second force that exerts a downward pres-
sure on prices, the changeover awareness. At the time of the euro changeover,
the public was quite concerned about increasing prices and the media showed
many reports about how ﬁrms converted prices. This increased awareness
28makes it difﬁcult for ﬁrms to take advantage of the changeover and in some
cases it appears to have induced ﬁrms to lower prices.
An important point is that small and larger ﬁrms are affected differently by
these two forces. Because of the media coverage, large ﬁrms such as retail
or restaurant chains have a much greater chance of damaging their reputation
by increasing prices at the changeover. Larger ﬁrms can, however, use the
increased coverage in the media to obtain good publicity by lowering prices.
These two forces explain almost all the price movements we observed at the
euro changeover. Thetwo forces also explain how price settingregulationscan
affect price setting behaviour during a changeover. For example, dual pricing
makes the conversion more transparent and thus reduces the upward pressure
on prices by mitigating the changeover confusion. Based on the empirical
analysis and the theoretical considerations, speciﬁc policy recommendations
for future changeovers are provided.
Another issue I address in the paper is the perceived impact. In all twelve
euro-countries, people perceived the changeover to have had a profound im-
pact on prices. This phenomenon is sometimes considered something policy
makers cannot do much about. I argue that instead of an unavoidable side ef-
fect, these perceptions are caused by the inexperience of the authorities to cope
with such a phenomenon. People are making a mistake when they believe that
the changeover had a profound impact on prices and a good policy should be
able to prevent people from getting such false impressions. As with the actual
impact, the perceived impact can be avoided with good economic policy.
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